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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE B. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,
-vs.ADIEL F. STEWART, LAMONT B.
GUNDERSEN, andRAYP. GREENWOOD, As Commissioners of Salt
Lake County and as Directors of the
Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer District; and E. R. CALLISTER, JR.,
Attorney General, State of Utah.
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8183

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT
This action was brought in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County under the Declaratory J udgments Act. Plaintiff asked for a declaration of his constitutional rights as a taxpayer which he claims are in
grave jeopardy by proceedings of the Salt Lake County

I
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Commissioners in creating, managing and operating the
Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District. Plaintiff
claims that his right to vote for local officers who have
the power to levy taxes for local corporate functions, is
denied, and that tlie constitutional provisions protecting
him from excessive debt and tax burdens are circumvented and ignored. From the District Courts' ruling that
"plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with prejudice, no
cause of action," plaintiff has appealed.

I

'

The parties are agreed as to the need for a sewer
in the area. It seems foolish, however, for 9,000 families
to build a colossal project for 45,000 families at the present high costs. It is also very necessary that sewer lines
be kept reasonably flushed. Large lines which are not
adequately used become obstructed and when full capacity is required, often need replacement; this has happened in other states.
An adequate sewer can be built within the limits of
the Constitution; the need for a sewer should not be used
as an excuse for breaking the law and ignoring constitutional provisions which guard individual freedom and
liberty. County Commissioners, who head a civil division
of the State, should not be permitted to usurp the corporate powers of local self-government by appointing
themselves the corporate officers of a local public corporation without the vote of the people in the local area,
to tax without limit in that area, and to exceed established debt limits.
If this sort of despotism is condoned by the courts,
then the Constitution which the courts have sworn to

2
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guard, is gone, and the courts have nothing left to guard
save the good will and approval of politicians and a legislative assembly-a legislative assembly which cannot disfranchise or deprive any one of the rights or privileges
of a citizen, unless a statute is passed for that purpose;
an assembly which can do no wrong unless it chooses to
do it. If legislation which emasculates and tears the Constitution to shreds is "implemented" by the courts, then
the police power of government will have again succeeded in usurping the private corporate powers of local
self-government of the people; liberty, freedom and dignity will have again fallen by the blindness, the ignorance
and the mental lethargy of man; and our course of
"progress" will have turned toward ruin. This is a fact
of history.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Apparently there is no dispute between the parties
as to questions of fact. The Salt Lake City Suburban
Sanitary District was originally created on September 9,
1946 by resolution and order of the Salt Lake County
Commission under authority of Chapter 14, Laws of
Utah, 1933 (Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953.) The history of the pertinent steps taken since that time which
are necessary for a determination of the issues in this
appeal are recited in the November 18, 1953 Bond Resolution (Exhibit E of the Record) pages 1 to 9.
The Salt Lake County Commissioners have appointed themselves Trustees of the Sewer District and have
made covenants with the future purchasers of the revenue

tO
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bonds. The District has provided for a $2,410,000.00
General bond issue and a $6,480,000.00 revenue bond
issue and has provided for the payment of said bonds.
The Salt Lake County Commissioners have effectuated the transfer of the financing and operation of the
district from the said 1933 Act to Chapter 29, Laws of
Utah 1953.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. A DEBT IS CREATED ON THE PROPERTY
IN THE DISTRICT WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS
OF SEC. 17-6-3.5 .CHAPTER 29, LAWS OF UTAH 1953 AND
ARTICLE XIV SECTION 4, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
POINT 2. TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
IS PERMITTED BY DELEGATING TO OTHER THAN THE
"CORPORATE AUTHORITIES" OF A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO TAX
IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
POINT 3. POLITICAL POWER OF THE STATE
USURPS THE CORPORATE POWERS OF LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS IN THAT:
A. COUNTIES ARE PERMITTED TO PERFORM LOCAL
CORPORATE FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE NOT UNIFORM
THROUGHOUT THE CLASS - ARTICLE XI SECTION 4.
B. THE SEWER DISTRICT IS A MUNI·CIPAL CORPORATION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ART. VI SEC. 26, ART.
XI SEC. 5, ART. XIII SEC. 5 AND ART. XIV SEC. 4.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1. A DEBT IS CREATED ON THE PROPERTY
IN THE DISTRICT WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS
OF SEC. 17-6-3.5 ·CHAPTER 29, LAWS OF UTAH 1953 AND
ARTICLE XIV SECTION 4 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

The proposed financing plan of the Salt Lake City
Suburban Sanitary District is illegal, void and unconstitutional, and is in violation of a writ of prohibition issued
by this Court. The revenue bonds are to be paid by a
service charge which becomes a lien upon property if
delinquent, and they are also to be paid by a 4 mill ad
valorem tax, and additional taxes can be levied if there
is a deficiency in the revenues. The revenue bond issue
is an obligation upon property in the district and creates
a debt which exceeds statutory and constitutional debt
limits.
Sec. 17-6-3.5, Chapter 29 Laws of Utah 1953, provides a 12o/a debt limit for all bonds other than those
payable solely from revenues. The general bond issue of
$2,410,000.00 is approximately 12o/a of the assessed $22,568,000.00 (Ex. H) value of the district. This sec. provides:
"The bonds * * * shall never be issued to an
amount which, together with all other existing indebtedness of the district then outstanding, will
exceed in principal amount twelve (12) per cent of
the assessed value of the taxable property in the
district * * *. Bonds issued * * * payable solely
from revenues * * * shall not be included as bonded indebtedness of the district for the purposes of
such computation."

5
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A four mill ad valorem tax is used in conjunction
with the monthly service charges to pay the $6,480,000.00
revenue bonds, therefore, these bonds are not payable
solely from revenues. That a four mill tax is used to help
pay the revenue bonds cannot be denied. Sec. 12, para.
2, Nov. 18, 1953 bond resolution (Ex. E), p. 40, provides:
"The board will fix and collect rates and
charges for all services supplied by the system
fully sufficient, after making allowance for delinquencies in collection, to provide (in conjunction
with the proceeds of the annual operation and
maintenance tax of four ( 4) mills which is to be
caused to be levied by the board) for the payment of the expenses of maintaining and operating
the system and to preserve it in good repair and
working order, to produce an amount in each fiscal year equal to 1.35 times the amount of interest
on the revenue bonds falling due on June 1 of
such fiscal year and principal and interest falling
due on December 1 of the next succeeding fiscal
year and in addition a sufficient amount to make
all other payments required to be made into the
various funds created in this resolution."
In analyzing the construction of the above sentence,
it can be seen that the prepositional phrases "to preserve," "to produce" and "to make" are in series. The
board agrees to fix and collect rates and charges fully
sufficient to provide (in conjunction with the proceeds
of a 4 mill tax) for the payment of expenses, payment
of interest and principal on the bonds when due, and all
other payments required to be made into the various
funds.
There is also the additional fact that the various
funds referred to (Sec. 11 of Ex. E) are to insure that
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sufficient money is available to make prompt payment
on the revenue bonds. If the Operation and Maintenance
Fund (Ex. E., p. 35 (a) ) were not "sweetened" by an
ad valorem tax, revenues would have to be used in its
place and there would be less money available for the
Revenue Bond and Interest Redemption Fund (Ex. E.,
p. 36 (b) ) . Using the 4 mill tax in the manner provided
is like adding ingredients to a measuring cup; what difference does it make whether the added ingredient is
placed at the bottom or top of the existing ingredient 1
Is not the required amount used to make the cake 1 If
there are not sufficient revenues in the Revenue Bond
and Interest Redemption Fund, the proceeds of an ad
valorem tax is added in the Operation and Maintenance
Fund to bring the revenues up to the required level.
Thus it can be plainly seen that the 4 mill tax supports, guarantees and is used for payment of the revenue
bonds in exactly the same manner and to the same extent
as the monthly service charge revenues. They are used
in conjunction with each other; therefore, the revenue
bonds are not payable solely from revenues but are payable primarily from revenues.
Authority is granted the district to levy taxes without regard to limitation or amount to pay both general
obligation bonds and revenue bonds payable primarily
from revenues. The said Nov. 18, 1953 bond resolution
(Ex. E) ) at p. 18, provides :
"Each bond shall contain the recital of regularity authorized by sec. 17-6-3.7 U.C.A.... "
Section 17-6-3.7 U.C.A. (Chapter 29, Laws of Utah,
1953), provides :

7
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"Such recital shall conclusively import full
compliance with all of the provisions of this chapter, and all bonds issued containing such recital
shall be incontestable for any cause whatsoever
after their delivery for value."
Sec. 17-6-3.5 of said chapter provides:
". . . regardless of any limitations contained
elsewhere in the laws of Utah and this act, including 17-6-3.8 of this act, it shall be the duty of
the board of trustees to cause to be levied annually
on all taxable property in the district taxes fully.
sufficient to pay principal of and interest on
such bonds as principal and interest fall due, or if
the bonds are payable primarily from revenues,
then to anticilpate a;nd make u.p any amownts which
may be necessary to pay such principal and interest by reason of deficiencies in such re:vewues."
(Italics added.)
The entire $8,890,000.00 bond issue is a general obligation against property. There is the additional fact
that monthly service charges are subject to a lien on the
property "on a parity with and collectible at the same
time and in the same manner as general county taxes
are a lien on such premises and are collectible." Sec.
17-6-3.6, Ch. 29, L. 53.
Sec. 12, para. 5, Nov. 18 resolution (Ex. E), p. 44,
provides:
"Any charge for services rendered by the sys~
tern which is not paid within ninety (90) days
from the date on which it becomes due, shall be
certified by the Clerk of the district to the Treasurer or Assessor of Salt Lake County and in each
such case such delinquent charges, together with
interest and penalties, shall immediately upon
such certification become a lien on the delinquent
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premises on a parity with and collectible at the
same time and in the same manner as general
county taxes, all as provided in Section 17-6-3.6,
U.C.A. 1953. It shall be the duty of the proper officials of Salt Lake County to utilize promptly all
methods of enforcing such lien available for collection of general county taxes, including sale of
the delinquent premises."
It cannot be denied that the revenues are effective
liens upon property and may be a means of divesting
a taxpayer of his property, and, therefore, the revenue
bonds are a debt within the meaning of the law. In the
writ of prohibition issued by this Court in Bigler et al.
v. Greenwood et al., ______ Utah ------, 254 Pac. 2d 843. At p.
847, this Court said :

"The plan followed was obviously designed
for the purpose a;nd actually had the effect of
imposing liens on the property within the distric·t.
If such a scheme could be followed and yet remain
classified as purely voluntary 'revenue bond' financing program, then the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and debt lirmits could
be circumvented while effectively creating charges
upon property. The district should not be permitted to accomplish by artifice, subterfuge or indirection what the law will not permit it to do
openly and directly." (Italics added.)
The district has violated said writ on a second count
in that the proposition to include the four mill tax used
to help pay the revenue bonds was not advertised and
was not voted upon at the Sept. 15, 1953 bond election.
Therefore, it lacks due process. Proposition No. 2 (Ex.
E, p. 8) in part provided:

9
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"* * * which bonds shall constitute special
obligations of said district payable solely from
the operating revenue to be derived by said district from the operation of its sanitary sewer system lying within its boundaries."
Because the service charges and the 4 mill ad valorem tax used to pay the revenue bonds and operation and
maintenance may be a means of divesting the taxpayer
of his property, the revenue bond financing program does
not come within the purview of the special fund doctrine.
The special fund doctrine was born in Barnes v. Lehi
City, 75 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 and has been reaffirmed
time and time again. At p. 338 of 74 Utah, this Court
quoted a Colorado case, Shields v. City of Loveland', 74
Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913, as follows:
"'Its meaning (debt) in the sections of the
Constitution and statutes now before us must be
determined by their purpose, which was to prevent
the overburdening of the public * * *. Clearly the
revenue bonds are not within that purpose. The
public can not be overburdened by that which it
is under no obligation to discharge, nor can the
city become bankrupt by that which it does not.
have to pay.'"
And further at p. 340, this Court said :
"The restrictions placed upon municipal corporations by the debt limit provisions of the Constitution must be upheld. The purpose of such
provisions is 'to serve as a limit to taxation and a
protection to taxpayers.' McQuillin, Mun. Corps.
(2d Ed) No. 2364."
The special fund doctrine has foundation in good
sense, provided the revenue bonds are kept entirely be10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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yond the police power of the state to divest one of his
property if payments are not made. Revenue bond financing includes the costs of operation and maintenance.
If ad valorem taxes can be used to "relieve the burden of
revenues" in order that the bonds can be more surely
paid, the program has been held to create a debt within
the purview of the Constitution.
In the book, Fimancing Through Revenue Bonds,
published by the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, revenue bonds are defined as follows:
"The term 'revenue bonds' is widely used, and
has a reasonably definite meaning. It is generally
understood to mean bonds which are payable out
of the revenues of a publicly-owned and selfliquidating utility, and which are purchased and
dealt in exclusively or primarily in reliance upon
the adequacy of such revenues to meet the service
charges upon the bonds, irn additi,on to paying
the costs of operation and maintenance of such
utility and all other charges upon such revenues."
(Underlining added.)
This Court in the Barnes case, further said:
"The credit of the city is not extended, nor
is any money which is derived from taxation or
other existing sources of revenue expended in the
purchase price or maintenance cost of the plant
The city cannot be coerced into applying any
part of its general revenue for the payment of the
purchase price of the plant or for any part of
the cost of maintenance thereof." (Italics added.)
In the case of Reiner v. Town of Holyoke, 27 Pac.
2d 1032 (Colo.) the city pledged income from a water
system to meet deferred payments on the plant, but pro-
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vided no special fund for freight, insurance, etc. in connection with the plant. The court held this created a debt
which could only be paid out of a tax levy and therefore
unconstitutional.
In the instant case the Board of Commissioners have
covenanted to "levy and collect in each fiscal year an ad
valorem tax levied on all taxable property in the district
at such rate not greater than four ( 4) mills on the dollar
as will be fully sufficient, in conjunction with any surplus * * * of Section 11 (e) * * * to pay all reasonably
necessary costs of maintaining and operating the, system
in such fiscal year."
Sec. 11 (a) of the Nov. 18, 1953 resolution, p. 35,
provides:
"Out of the revenues other than the initial
payments there shall be first set aside * * * such
amount, if any, as may be necessary to provide for
the payment of such part of the expenses of maintaining and operating the system in such fiscal
year as may be in excess of the proceeds derived
in such fiscal year from the levy of the four (4)
mills operation and maintenance tax* * *."
If the charges used directly or indirectly for the payment of revenue bonds can be a means of divesting a
taxpayer of his property, then the bonds are an effective
mortgage upon property and come within constitutional
limitations. In the special fund theory, the payments of
revenue bonds are subject to risk the same as any business enterprise operating in a free market. If that risk
is circumvented and a sure payment is guaranteed "in
the same manner and to the same extent as taxes are a
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lien," then the special fund financing program has become a debt as sure as death and taxes.
This Court consistently has frowned on plans and
schemes to circumvent the special fund philosophy, as is
reflected in the decisions and language in State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285; Barnes v. Lehi C~ty,
Supra; Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 Pac. 2d
144; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 Pac.
2d 161; Uta.h Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah
203, 74 Pac. 2d 1191; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden
City, 95 Utah 161, 79 Pac. 2d 61; and Spence v. U.S.A.C.,
------ Utah ______ , 225 Pac. 2d 18.
In .State v. Candland, this Court said at p. 427 of 36
Utah:
"If the amount necessary to pay principal and
interest were in fact taken from income of the university, it would simply result in requiring the
state to supply the amount so taken from its general fund for 'general maintenance,' and hence
nothing would be gained, so far as the taxpayer
is concerned * * * ."
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, this court
said at p. 1208 of 74 Pac. 2d:
"And since the city is, by the Constitution,
prohibited from incurring debts beyond the specified limit, they cannot by subterfuge or indirection
do that which they could not do openly and directly. The debt inhibition was written into the Constitution to protect the citizens from, and assure
them that there would be no excessive tax burden
imposed upon them. This because the duty of,
and necessity for, payment of tax is not optional
or contractual, but a burden imposed not with
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the consent, but often against the will, of the taxpayer. There is the further reason that a tax
becomes a lien upon the property of the taxpayer
and may be a means of divestilng him of his property. By its express terms the Constitution makes
the limitations and inhibitions on the taxing power
mandatory and prohibitory. Article 1, S. 26."
(Italics added.)
In the instant case the service charges are on a parity with taxes and can be a means of divesting the taxpayer of his property. The district is trying to do by
subterfuge what it cannot do openly; that is, guarantee
the revenue bonds by charges upon prop€rty. In addition
to this provision, an ad valorem tax up to 4 mills is used
in the same manner and to the same extent and in conjunction with the service charges to pay the revenue
bonds and operation and maintenance and an additional
tax can be levied if needed. The general obligation bond
issue of $2,410,000.00 and the revenue bond issue of $6,480,000.00 makes a total debt of $8,890,000.00 which is
approximately 40% of the assessed valuation. This is
in excess of the 12% debt limit of Sec. 17-6-3.5, Ch. 29,
L. 53, Supra.
Section 4 of Article XIV, Const. of Utah, prohibits
involuntary corporate entities such as counties from exceeding a 2% debt limit for its proprietary functions and
voluntary corporate entities from exceeding a maximum
12% debt limit for its proprietary functions. The corporate nature of the sewer district and its application to
this Article is argued in Point 3, hereinafter.
In Condor v. Univ. of Utah, ------ Utah ------, 257 Pac.
2d 367, this Court chose to apply a "limited special fund"
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theory to the State University. If this theory is extended
to include a local, corporate function of a community as
in the instant case, then the taxpayers right to constitutional protection from burdensome and ruinous taxation is completely gone, and this part of the Constitution
has been turned into mere nonsense. This Court said in
State v. Carndland, Supra, at p. 429 of 36 Utah:
"If the debt limit may be exceeded in the
manner provided * * * then there is practically no
limitation in this state."
Appellant has asked for a declaration of his constitutional right to debt limit protection. If he does not
possess such rights, then let us face the truth that the
clock is being turned back toward the despotism of the
rulers of the serfs.
POINT 2. TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
IS PERMITTED BY DELEGATING TO OTHER THAN THE
"CORPORATE AUTHORITIES" OF A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO TAX
IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

"The power of taxation is, of all the powers of
government, the one most liable to abuse, even when
exercised by the direct representatives of the people, and
if committed to persons who may exercise it over others
without reference to their consent, the certainty of its
abuse would be simply a question of time." So said the
Supreme Court of Illinois in Harward v. St. Clair Drain.
Co., 51 Ill.130 at p. 135.
In State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 Pac. 337, this
Court said at p. 483 of 27 Utah:
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"The idea which permeates our whole system
is that local authority shall manage and control
local affairs. These are inalienable rights of the
people, guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, and can not be taken away. 'LocaJ.
self-government,' says Judge Cooley, "having always been a part of the English and American
systems, we shall look for its recognition in any
such instrument. And, even if not expressly recognized, it is still to be understood that all these
instruments are framed with its present existence
and anticipated continuance in view.' Cooley,
Const. Lin. 47. See, also, Page 223, I d. The Constitution of this State, the same as of every other
State, was framed with local self-government in
view. History shows that the territory which is
comprised within the boundaries of this State
constituted, under the territorial form of government, a system of subdivisions, having been
divided into counties, precincts, and other districts and municipalities. Each of these subdivisions had, under the general laws of the territory, a system of local self-government, whereby
LOCAL AFFAIRS WERE CONTROLLED BY
LOCAL AUTHORITIES ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE OF THE SUBDIVISION. THIS WAS
SO AS TO TAXATION, AS WELL AS TO
OTHER SUBJ'ECTS." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant sewer case, the Salt Lake County
Commissioners have, by resolution, appointed themselves
the Board of Trustees of the sewer district subdivision
and two of the present county commissioners do not live
within the district. There has been no election of the
"corporate authorities," and, in addition, "agents" of the
revenue bondholders are granted some of the power to
manage and control the district.
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This Court continues to say at p. 483 of 27 Utah:
"When the Constitution was framed, the
same system of subdivisions and local government
was adopted, with, in some instances, closer adherence to local government, as where** *the Legislature is forbidden to 'impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal
corporation, but may be law, vest in the corporate
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to
assess and collect taxes for all purpose of such
corporation.' Article 13, Sec. 5."
The officers of the sewer district can and intend to
levy taxes. Sec. 9, p. 32 of the November 18, 1953
bond resolution (Ex. E), provides:
"Acting pursuant to the provisions of Section,
17-6-3.5, U.C.A. 1953, the board covenants and
agrees that it will cause to be levied annually
against all taxable property in the district beginning with the year 1954, taxes fully sufficient to
pay principal of and interest on the general obligation bonds as such principal and interest become due, and that such taxes will be levied without limitation as to rate or amount."
Sec. 12, p. 41, further provides:
"The board will levy and collect in each fiscal
year an ad valorem tax levied on all taxable property in the district at such rate not greater than
four ( 4) mills on the dollar as will be fully sufficient, in conjunction with any surplus available
from the preceding fiscal year under the provisions of Section 11 (e) hereof * * *."
That the board of trustees of the district have the
statutory authority to levy taxes cannot be denied. Sec.
17-6-3.4, Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953, provides:
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"* * the board of trustees of the district shall
adopt and certify to the county clerk a resolution
specifying the amount of taxes to be levied for
such year on the property of the district, and it
shall be the mandatory duty of the board of county
commissioners * * to levy a tax * * at the rate
specified in said resolution of the board of
trustees."
This Court in Tygesenv. Magna Water Co., 116 Utah
......, 226 Pac. 2d 127 recognized this as a direct power to
levy taxes. At p. 132 of 226 Pac. 2d, this Court said:
"The taxes which the Act empowers the District to levy for the payment of the benefits are
general taxes and not special assessments."
There has been no election in the district of the
"corporate authorities" who levy these taxes. Nor is
there any method or means or statutory authority whereby the people can now call for an election. Sec. 17-6-3.1,
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1953, para. 3, recites the only
procedure provided for calling an election of officers:
"Upon petition, signed by at least ten (10)
per cent of the persons eligible to vote on a bond
issue in any district created under this act, being
filed with the Board of County Commissioners,
thirty (30) days prior to the date set for the
bond election, or ninety (90) days prior to the
date set for succeeding elections, requesting that
an election for trustees be held, the Board of
County Commissioners shall be required to proceed with the election in the manner provided
hereafter."
Does the term "succeeding elections" mean succeeding elections of officers or succeeding bond elections~
The bond election has been held and no date for succeed-
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ing elections of officers can be set until after the first
election of officers. Sec. 17-6-3.1, further provides :

"* * After the first election, elections for
elective members of boards of trustees shall be
held on the first Wednesday in December in each
succeeding two years after the first election."
The time for calling the first election of officers is
past and the possibility of any future bond election being
called by the trustees is remote. The taxpayers cannot
petition for a bond election under the provisions of the
Improvement District Act as amended by Chapter 29,
Laws of Utah 1953. The Salt Lake County Commissioners have appointed themselves the Board of Trustees
of the Sewer District. See the Nov. 18, 1953 Bond resolution (Ex. E), Sec. 1, para.1, p. 9.
In Tygesen v. Magna Wa.ter Co., Supra, this Court
held that an Improvement District is a separate and
distinct arm of the government. At p. 135 of 226 Pac. 2d,
the court said :
"Since a district is not a county but a separate arm of the government distinct from counties
or municipalities, the constitutional provisions as
to counties do not apply."
And further at p. 130:
"The fact that proceedings to initiate an Improvement District is left to the county commissioners of the counties in which the Districts can
be formed might lend some support to an argument that a district would not be a separate and
distinct arm of the government but merely be an
arm of a county for the purpose of carrying out
a county function, were it not for the fact that
once the District is actually organized the county
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has no further connection with the District except
the ministerial one of levying any taxes certified
to it by the Board of Trustees, a duty of the
county which is similar to that performed by it
for Boards of Education under the provisions of
Sec. 75-12-10, U.C.A. 1943."
Can the county commissioners create and appoint
themselves the head of a "separate and distinct arm of
the government" by resolution and without the vote of
the people in that separate and distinct district and then
proceed to certify and levy the taxes for such district~
Can the county commissioners by resolution administe~
and control a school district~ The "corporate authorities"
must be qualified members of the corporation and must
be elected to the office by the corporate members before
they can assess and levy the general taxes of the corporation.
The right to vote for the "corporate authorities" who
have the power to levy taxes has not been at issue before
the courts in the special district cases and is one of the
vital issues in the instant case. This valid complaint
should not have been "dismissed with prejudice, no cause
of action" by the District Court.
The issue of election of officers was not before this
Court when the Improvement District Act was considered
in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra. The statute
which was under review in the Magna case provided for
an election of three trustees at the bond election "each
of whom shall be a taxpayer and a qualified voter in the
district." Sec. 7, Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949.
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In prior cases before this Court involving special
districts, the question of election of officers has not been
adjudicated. It was not ruled upon in Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy DiJst., 106 Utah 55, 145, Pac. 2d
503, nor in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 Pac. 2d
530, nor in Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500.
In Argyle v. Johnson, Supra, the Drainage Act of
1907 was reviewed by this Court. The point at issue was
that the law permitted a taxpayer no hearing as to
whether his property would be benefited and no method
whereby his property could be excluded if so determined,
that it would not be benefited.
Title 20, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, under which
the drainage district in the Argyle case was created, provided the following steps in its formation: (1) A petition
signed by a majority of the property holders asking for
the formation and defining the boundaries. (2) A hearing
as to the boundaries and any lands not included could
be included, but none could be excluded. (3) A secret
ballot on the election to creat the district; a two thirds
majority of the electors was necessary to carry the election. And ( 4) A secret ballot for election of trustees of
the district.
It was the issue brought by provision (2) which was
before the court in the Argyle case. This Court held as
follows at p. 507 of 39 Utah:
"The * * objection, which is the serious one
in the case, is the one that the act in question permits private property to be taken without due
process of law. This contention rests upon the
fact that in forming drainage districts the law
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provides for no means by which a landowner may
have a hearing and determination of the questions
of whether his lands are subject to improvement,
or can or will be improved by the system of drainage which is proposed by those who present the
petition to the county commissioners."
The Drainage District Act was subsequently
amended in lieu of this adverse decision and the elective
features of (3) and ( 4) above, which are fundamental
rights of a free people, were not included in the revised
law. Great emphasis and importance was placed upon
the formal hearing while ignoring the more important
and fundamental rights to management and control and
taxation by "corporate authorities." See Sec. 2040-26,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917.
The right of the people to exercise their franchise by
the secret ballot for the officers of a governmental unit
who are to levy the general taxes of that unit, and the
election to create the special governmental unit is a
fundamental principle of a free people. Art. IV No. 8
of our Constitution provides that "All elections shall be
by secret ballot." This fundamental right should not
liave been so lightly dropped from the statutes by the
legislature.
The power to levy taxes cannot be delegated to other
than the "corporate authorities." See Art. XIII #5, Const.
of Utah, Supra. This constitutional provision will be discussed in two parts: (a) Definition of the term "corporate authorities," and (b) The corporate nature of the
sewer district. Part (a) will be immediately argued; part
(b) will be argued in Point 3 hereinafter.
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This Court has had occasion to define the term
"corporate authorities." In State v. Standford, 24 Utah
148, 66 Pac. 1061. This Court said, at p. 159 of 24 Utah :
"The terms of the Constitution are made
mandatory and prohibitory, unless declared to be
otherwise. Section 26 Article 1. By the term
"corporate authorities" must be intended those
municipal officers who are either directly elected
by the population to be taxed or appointed in some
mode to which they have given their assent.
Hessler v. Commissioners, 53 Ill. 113."
This Court in this same case referred to Harward v.
St. Clair Drain Co., Supra, in which the Supreme Court
of Ill. in discussing the status of Drainage Commissioners
who had been appointed by legislative authority without
a vote of the people in the district (which is on all fours
with the instant sewer district case) and in ruling upon
the constitutional article similar to our Article XIII #5,
said at p. 135 of 51 Ill. :
"We are of opinion that we do no violence to
the language of the clause in the constitution we
have been considering, by holding that it was
designed to prevent such ill-advised legislation as
the delegation of the taxing power to any person
or persons other than the "corporate authorities"
of the municipality or district to be taxed. These
authorities are elected by the people to be taxed,
or appointed in some mode to which the people
have given their assent, and to them alone can this
power be safely delegated."
·
The trustees have no authority to tax the property
holders in the corporate limits of the sewer district. It
is a fundamental principle of free government that local
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affairs shall be managed and controlled by local authorities and taxes levied by them. This Court had occasion
to look into the fundamental principles of government
involved in the instant case in State v. Eldredge, Supra.
At p. 483 of 27 Utah, this Court said:
"One of the distinctive features of our republican form of government is the system of local
self-government, whereby local governmental affairs are administered by local authorities, and
not by agents of the general government."
That the county commissioners are but the agents
of the state government in the instant case is argued in
Point 3, Post. The Constitution of Utah prohibits county
commissioners from administering, controlling and levying taxes for corporate functions which are not uniformly
administered throughout the county. The people of Bingham, for instance, should not have the right to vote for
the "corporate authorities" of a "separate and distinct
arm of the government" in an area in which they have
no interest such as the sewer district. This subject is
further developed and argued in Point 3 hereinafter and
authorities are cited.
The county commissioners cannot levy taxes of the
sewer district as county commissioners, and they are
without authority to levy taxes as trustees of the sewer
district because they have not been so elected by the
people. Also, the people have never assented to the manner of their appointment because they have had no opportunity to vote on the resolution to create the district. The
Supreme Court of Illinois in the Harward case, at p.
136 of 51 Ill., further said :

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The persons to be taxed have never given
their assent to this act, and have had no voice in
the selection of the members of this corporation.
As the object of this constitutional clause was to
prevent the legislature from granting the power
of local taxation to persons over whom the population to be taxed could exercise no control, it is
evident that, by the phrase 'corporate authorities,'
must be understood those municipal officers who
are either directly elected by such population or
appointed in some mode to which they have given
their assent."
The legislature has exceeded its authority in delegating to county commissioners the power to create, operate and tax a "separate and distinct arm of the government." See Point 3 Post. If the county commissioners
can initiate and levy the taxes for a special district in
the county, then the district must be an arm of the county.
This Court has held that an improvement district is a
"separate arm of the government distinct from counties.
In the instant case the constitutional right of the
taxpayer to vote for the "corporate authorities" is denied.
The taxpayers in the district are to be taxed by officers
who have no authority to so tax. This is taxation without
representation; this is a principle our forefathers
thought just cause for revolution.
POINT 3. POLITICAL POWER OF THE STATE
USURPS THE CORPORATE POWERS OF LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS IN THAT:
A. COUNTIES ARE PERMITTED TO PERFORM LOCAL
CORPORATE FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE NOT UNIFORM
THROUGHOUT THE CLASS - ARTICLE XI SECTION 4.
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B. THE SEWER DISTRICT IS A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ART. VI SEC. 26, ART.
XI SEC. 5, ART. XIII SEC. 5 AND ART. XIV SEC. 4.

This point will be argued in the following order:
A.
B.

The Sewer District as a Corporation.
Definition of a Public Corporation.
(1) The body politic- The police power.
(2) The body corporate - Tlie proprietary
power.

C.

The Corporate Nature of Counties.

D. The Sewer District as a Municipal Corporation.
E. Limits of Legislative Control.

A. The Sewer District as a Corporation.
The corporate nature of the sewer district must be
defined to determine if constitutional provisions apply.
Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53, provides :
"The Board of trustees shall exercise all
powers and duties in the operation of the properties of the district as are ordinarily exercised
by the governing body of a politico! subdivision."
What are the corporate powers of a political subdivision~ Which subdivision~ Is the sewer district a
·separate political arm of the government or is it a corporate arm or is it both~ If it is a corporation, is it a
private or a public corporation~ If a public corporation
is it a municipal corporation~
That the sewer district is a corporation cannot be
denied. It has authority to acquire a complete sewer
system, issue bonds, have made an official seal, employ
agents and "The board shall have the right to sue and
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be sued, to enter into all contracts which it may consider
desirable * *." Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53. This Court
had occasion to define with completeness a corporation
in Utah State Building Commission, for Use and Benefit
of Mounta,in States Supply Co. v. Great American Indemnity Co. et al., 105 Utah 11, 140 Pac. 2d 763. At p. 17 and
18 of 105 Utah, this court said :
"Neither the name an entity is given, nor the
failure to properly characterize it by name, determines its status in the law. We must look to the
nature of the entity, its powers and duties, to
determine whether or not it is a corporation. Rees
v. Olmsted, 6 Cir., 135 F·. 296, 297, 68 Corpus Juris
67. * * * * A leading case cited by most later ones
discussing this subject is that of Gross v. Kentucky Board of Managers of World's Columbian
Exposition, 105 Ky. 840, 49 S.W. 458, 43 L.R.A.
703. The court held that the said Board of Managers, appointed by the Governor as an agency of
the State, although not expressly called such,
was a corporate entity which could be sued for
breach of contract because it had the· power to
contract.

t~
wer
Joy

"A case closely resembling the instant one is
that of Whipple v. Tuxworth, 81 Ark. 391, 99
S.W. 86; in that case, the question was whether
or not improvement districts created by statute
were corporations. The court stated at page 90
of 99 S.W.: 'Improvement districts in this state
are organized by the city councils of cities and
towns under a valid law. They are given a particular name, and endowed with perpetual succession until their object is accomplished, with power
to make contracts, incur debts, issue bonds, collect
assessments, to sue, and to compel the city council
by mandamus to make assessments. * * * The

no
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l
effect of the statue is to make them corporations,
though they are not denominated as such.' Citing
other case.
"In the case of Hancock v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 145 U.S. 409, 415, 12 S.Ct. 969, 36
L.Ed. 755, the Supreme Court of the United States
also referred to this problem and stated at page
412 of 145 U.S., at page 971 of 12 S.Ct.: 'This
prescribed portion of Shelby county was authorized to issue bonds and subscribe stock * * * if
this entity has power to create a debt, it becomes
subject to suit * * * it was, though not named, a
corporate entity.' This was so, even though no
express power to sue or be sued was given to it
by statute."
This Court, however, in Tygesen v. Magna Water
Co., supra, when considering the provision of Article
XI #5 which provides that "Corpus for Mun. purposes
shall not be created," held that an improvement district
was not a corporation. At p. 131 o~ 226 Pac. 2d, this
Court said:
"An improvement district created under
Chap. 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is not a corporation
but is a separate arm of the government formed
for public purposes* *."
However, a corporation is defined in the immediately
preceding paragraph on p. 130:
"Once the District is formed the Board of
Trustees have full control and supervision of the
property and the conduct of affairs of the District. The District must have its own seal and its
Board of Trustees may sue and be sued."
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion stated
at p. 139:
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"An Improvement District is an entity under
Chapter 24 with powers to cause taxes to be levied
for the limited purposes of the district, power to
sue and amendability to suit, to make contracts
for the benefit of the district, to own and use an
official seal and generally to "perform or cause
to be performed all acts which in its (the
trustees') opinion are necessary and desirable in
the conduct of its affairs and in the operation of
the properties of the district. * * Having all the
attributes of a corporation * *, it must be considered as such."
The sewer district then, is a corporation. That the
sewer district is a private corporation in its makeup and
management may be debatable, however, from the following definition, it can be seen that the district is a public
corporation.

B. Definition of a Public Corporation.
Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.)
#106, p. 249 defines three kinds of corporations: (1)
PUBLIC-composed of the political or civil and tlie
municipal. This group includes counties, townships,
school, road, reclamation, cities, towns, villages, boroughs,
etc., which possess the power to levy taxes which power
is a state political power. (2) TECHNICALLY PRIVATE but quasi-public in character. This group is
privately owned and includes railway, canal, telegraph,
telephone, water , light, gas-the so called public utility
corporations which derive expenses and profits from
earnings. These have important governmental powers
such as eminent domain, but they do not have the power
to levy taxes or make assessments on property. (3)
STRICKLY PRIVATE to promote private interests.
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The owners of the technically private and the strictly
private corporations are various individuals who have
voluntarily invested their money in the enterprise as
represented by stock certificates of ownership. Each
share usually represents one vote for the officers of the
corporation and for its general policy.
The certificate of ownership of the public corporation might be said to be the property tax rolls or some
evidence of citizenship. Each owner has the right to call
. upon the "police power of the state" for the protection of
his life, liberty and property; and each one has the right
to vote his "one share" as evidenced by his citizenship
for the officers of the police power-the body politic. The
public corporation is composed of two entirely different
means or functions: (1) The political or civil-the purely
governmental-the body politic and (2) The properietary
-the body corporate. For the special assessments and
debts of the proprietary-the body corporate-the "one
share" can be voted only by "such qualified electors as
shall have paid a property tax." Const. of Utah, Art.

XIV #3.
To understand the terms of the Constitution of Utah,
one must first define the principles of freedom and
liberty upon which our constitutional form of government
is based. For what functions and under what conditions
can the government legitimately use the money it collects by force from the owners~ What is the purpose of
government~ Is it to own and administer property for
the people or is it to protect the people in their individual
ownership~ What tendencies in the nature of men and
governments as taught by history does the Constitution
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aim to guard against? Can the political, lawmaking side
of the State exercise its police power to force a corporate
function upon a local territory without the consent of the
people in that territory? W~at is a municipal corporation and what are its functions and what protectional
guards does it provide for the people? These questions
must be answered before an intelligent answer can be
made as to what the terms of the Constitution mean.
Article I No. 1, Constitution of Utah, says:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; * * *."
This court in construing the fundamental principle
of the delegating of the taxing power in State v. Eldredge, supra, at p. 483 of 27 Utah, said:
"In construing the supreme law, the meaning of the framers must be ascertained from the
whole purview of the instrument, and, in construing a particular section, the court may refer to any
other section or provision to ascertain what was
the object, purpose, and intention of the Constitution makers in adopting such section. In a case
like this the court will also consider the system of
government in vogue prior to and at the time of
the framing of the Constitution, and the political
history of the country, and, out of the different
constructions possible, will adopt and apply that
which is most in accord with the genius of our
institutions, the most likely intended by the
framers of the instrument. Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Inter-State Com., 162 U.S. 197, 218, 16 Sup. Ct.
666, 40 L. Ed. 940."
The public corporation, as stated above, has two
separate characteristics which must be defined: the
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police power and the proprietary power.
(1) The body politic-The police power.

Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th edition),
Chap.16,p.704,says:
•
"The police power of the State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the State seeks not
only to preserve the public order and to prevent
offenses against the State, but also to establish
for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those
rules of good manners and good neighborhood
which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights,
and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent
with a like enjoyment of rights by others."
The police power is a system of internal regulation,
rules of good manners, or order for the conforming of
behavior. It is the law-making and law-enforcing power.
Upon what should these rules or laws be based~ F'or this
answer it is necessary to recur to the fundamental principles of free government. Article I No. 27, Const. of
Utah, says:
"F-requent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights
and the perpetuity of free government."
At the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,
Vol. I, p. 362, a motion was made to strike this section
from the proposed constitution. Mr. Wells, speaking
against the motion said:
"Mr. Chairman, the committee deems this to
be a patriotic utterance, that frequent recurrence
should be made to fundamental principles, be32
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cause the tendency of the times might be as it has
been in the past, not to recur very often to fundamental principles. When the people are oppressed
and do not get their rights, it may be necessary to
recur to fundamental principles * * *."
Mr. Wells anticipated conditions of today, for the
time of which he spoke is surely now. Power is given
the sewer district to tax and create debt without limit and
to tax without representation. The political arm of the
government is permitted to usurp the corp·orate powers of
local self-government.
The police power of the State-the body politiccan only legitimately be used to protect basic human
rights. Bastiats'-The Law, p. 6, says:
"Life, faculties, production-in other words,
individuality, liberty, property-this is man. And
in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders,
these three gifts from God precede all human
legislation, and are superior to it. Life, liberty,
and property do not exist because men have made
laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life,
liberty, and property existed beforehand that
caused men to make laws in the first place.
"The law is the collective organization of the
individual right to lawful defense. Each of us
has a natural right-from God-to defend his
person, his liberty, and his property. These are
the three basic requirements of life * * *.
"If every person has the right to defendeven by force-his person, his liberty, and his
property, then it follows that a group of men have
the right to organize and support a common force
to protect these rights constantly. Thus the principle of collective right-its reason for existing,
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its lawfulness-is based on individual right. And
the common force that protects this collective right
cannot logically have any other purpose or any
other mission than that for which it acts as a substitute. Thus, since an individual cannot lawfully
use force against the person, liberty, or property
of another individual, then the common force-for
the same reason-cannot lawfully be used to destroy the person, liberty, or property of individuals or groups."
Article I No. 2, Constitution of Utah, provides:
"All political power is inherent in the peOple; and all free governments are founded on
their authority for their equal protection and
benefit • * *."
The primary purpose of government, then, is to
protect individual liberty; and the police force of the.
government is the collective force to protect individual
liberty. The police power of the state can be used for no
other legitimate ends. The police power can legitimately
be used to enforce rules of conduct, but when it is used
to force people to invest their money and property in
government planned corporate enterprises in which
the people involved have no voice and no control, then the
police power has become an instrument which violates
human rights. Perversions of this nature by governments, stifle liberty and create the fertile foundation upon which despotism and tyranny is born and flourishes,
and has caused the downfall of free governments.
The county commissioners, acting in their capacity
as agents of the state police power, can, to protect the
public health, enforce laws, by fine and imprisonment,
forbidding the dumping of sewage in or on the ground
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In areas where public health is endangered; but the
Constitution forbids them the power to furnish the corporate means for disposal of sewage in local areas. These
corporate functions are reserved for local self-government of the people directly involved.
When an unincorporated area becomes compactly
settled, certain corporate functions must be performed
by the people as a corporate entity. Certain of the police
powers of the state are delegated to the local area under
the general laws to force minority groups to join in the
corporate endeavor-to permit taxation of property, etc.
This use of the police power has a tendency toward despotism, and experience has shown that the tendency of
men and governments is to let this force get out of hand
until all property is administered by agents of government.
The Constitution places limits beyond which local
governments are forbidden to go in furnishing corporate
services, and one of the main functions of the state and
its purely political agents such as counties, is to see that
the constitutional provisions and the general laws protecting individuals rights are obeyed. It has been the
lesson of history that the police power can be best held
in check by keeping the State and its civil subdivisions
such as counties, out of corporate business; and by keeping as close to the people as possible the police power
which is used for corporate enterprise. The result of
this endeavor has accounted for the growth and development of the laws of local self-government and the protective guards in constitutions surrounding municipal cor-
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porations of all kinds. In State v. Eldredge, supra, at p.
483 of 27 Utah, this court said:
"All our institutions were founded with a view
to local self-government, and assume its continuance as one of the undoubted rights of the people.
Cooley, Const. Lim. 207. Looking into the Constitutions of the several States and of the United
States, it will readily be observed that the intention of the framers of those instruments was that
the agencies by which power was to be exercised
should be brought as close as possible to the subjects upon which the power was to operate. When
the care exercised and means adopted are taken
into consideration, the conclusion seems irrestible
that the design was to bring the agencies and subjects into the closest possible proximity. The de·sign of juxtaposition of agencies and subjects is
clearly discernible by an examination of our
American constitutional law. It is, likewise, under
the English system of government, from which,
doubtless, our forefathers obtained the idea. In
contradistinction to a purely monarchial form of
government, where the power is concentrated in
one supreme ruler, our American system of government is opposed to centralization ·of power. The
idea which permeates our whole system is that
local authority shall manage and control local affairs. These are inalienable rights of the pe·ople,
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States, and can not be taken away."
The police power'-the political functions of our
State are divided between the three main branches of the
state: (1) The legislative-the law making body, (2) The
Executive-the law enforcement, the tax assessor and collector, the recorder, and (3) The judicial-the interpreter
and guardian of the law. These functions are purely gov-
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ernmental, no property ownership by the public corporation is involved; and these governmental functions are
centered in the State· as defined and limited by the Constitution. These governmental powers are delegated by the
state to local areas by general laws as required by valid
statutory and constitutional provisions, and represent
the body politic side of a public corporation.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) p. 5,
says:
"The term constitutional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules or
maxims not only locate the sovereign power in
individuals or bodies designated or chosen in some
prescribed manner, but also define the limits of its
exercise so as to protect individual rights, and
shield them against the assumption of arbitrary
power.''
The provisions of the Constitution of Utah limiting
and defining this police power of the state are definite
and specific. The legislature has exceeded its authority
in creating and delegating to the Salt Lake City Suburban
Sanitary District the power to tax without limit and without representation, to usurp the functions of local selfgovernment and to create debt without limit.
Before referring to the constitutional provisions violated, a better understanding of a public corporation
should be had by defining the body corporate.

2.

The body corporate-The Proprietary Power.

It is impossible to define the body corporate side of
a public corporation without defining a municipal corpo-
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ration. Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (2nd
Ed.) p. 997, says:

"* * * The test of corporate character was
its property capacity. * * * As a municipal corporation has a dual capacity, being a body politic
and corporate, it exercises two kinds of powers,
namely, public and private."
A corporation with but the purely governmental
powers is the State-the police power. A corporation
with the p~wer to own and manage property, but without
the police power to tax or assess the general public as
owners of the corporation, is a private corporation. A
corporation with both the governmental and proprietary
powers is a municipal corporation.
It assists to an understanding of a public corporation
to distinguish between public and quasi and municipal
corporations. Vol. I Dillon Municipal Corporations (5th
Ed.) No. 37, P. 67, says:
"Uivil corporations are of different grades
or classes, but in essence and nature they must
all be regarded as public. The school district or
the road district is usually invested by general
enactments operating throughout the State with
a corporate character, the better to perform within and for the locality its special function, which
is indicated by its name. It is but an instrumentality of the State, and the State incorporates it
that it may the more effectually discharge· its
appointed duty. So with Counties. They are involuntary political or civil divisions of the State,
created by general laws to aid in the administration of government. * * * They are purely auxiliaries of the State; * * *. Considered with respect
to the limited number of their corporate powers,
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the bodies above named rank low down in the scale
or grade of corporate existence; and hence have
been frequently termed quasi corporations. This
designation distinguishes them on the one hand
from private corporations proper, such as cities
or towns acting under charters, or incorporating
statutes, and which are invested with more powers
and endowed with special functions relating to
the particular or local interests of the municipality, and to this end are granted a larger measure
of corporate life.
"* * * Nearly all of the courts have drawn
a marked line of distinction between municipal
corporations and quasi corporations, in respect
to their liability to persons injured by their neglect of duty. * * * One reason given for the distinction is, that with respect to local or municipal
powers proper (as distinguished from those conferred upon the municipality as a mere agent of
the state) the inhabitants are to be regarded as
having been clothed with them at their request
and for their peculiar and special advantage, and
that as to such powers and the duties springing
out of them, the corporation has a private character, and is liable, on the like principles and generally to the same extent, as a private corporation."
This private side is the proprietary-the body corporate. At #97, p. 153, Dillon continues:
"The administration of justice, the preservation of the public peace, and the like, although
confided to local agencies, are essentially matters
of public concern; while the enforcement of municipal by-laws proper, the establishment of local
gas works, of local water works, the construction
of local sewers, and the like, are matters which
ordinarily pertain to the municipality as distinguished from the State at large."
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C.

The Corporate Nature of Counties.

A better understanding of a public corporation can
be had by defining the corporate nature of counties. The
United States Supreme Court in State of Ma.rylarnd v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 3 How. 534, said:
"Counties are nothing more than certain portions of the territory into which the state is divided for the more convenient exercise of the
powers of government."
In 20 Corpus Juris Secundus-Counties, p. 753, it
says:
"As stated in Corpus Juris, which has been
quoted with approval, comprehensively considered, a county is an involuntary political or civil
division of the state, created by statute to aid
in the administration of government." Citing case:
"One of the political subdivisions of the state, created only for public purposes, to facilitate and
promote the administraiton of state government."
State v. Oviatt, 4 Ohio 481, Affirmed 8 Ohio C.
Ct. N.S. 567.
See 15 Corpus Juris 388 and cases cited therein. 20
C.J.S.-Gounties, p. 757 and 758 continues:
"In accordance with these rules, a county is
distinguished from a city or town, as a municipal
corporation; (Counties are involuntary subdivisions of the state; cities and other municipalities
are voluntary." Campe v. Cermak, 161 N.E. 761,
Ill.) it is distinguished from a city, in that it is
only governmental in character and does not possess the double governmental and private character possessed by a city. ('A county is distinguishable from a city, in that the latter is created
by charter, is granted power to own and manage
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private property and is invested with a particular
franchise, whereas a county is created for the purpose of state government and exercises certain
political powers as one of the state·'s civil divisions.' Nassau County v. Lincer, 3 NYS 2d 327, affirmed 4 NYS 2d 77, 254 App. Div. 746, affirmed 20 NE 2d 1018.) However, * * * some
decisions hold a county a municipal corporation
equally with a city or town." Note: 15 C.J., p.
391, note 32 and cases cited therein.
From a study of the above it is seen that to the extent a county exercises corporate functions (proprietary
powers), it is so graded as a municipal corporation. In
Utah the counties have been permitted to exercise proprietary powers to a greater extent than in most jurisdictions. To insure that these proprietary powers exercised by counties would be kept within proper bound~
and that local self-government would not be usurped or
interferred with by agents of the state police power, the
Constitution makers made it mandatory that the system
of government in the county should be uniformly administered throughout the class. Article XI #4, provides :
"The Legislature shall establish a system of
County government, which shall be uniform
throughout the State,** *."
Vol. I McQuillin Mun. Corpns. (2d Ed.) #212, p. 621,
says:
"Many state constitutions provide, in substance, that the legislature shall establish but one
system of county government which shall be as
nearly uniform as practicable throughout the
state. * * * The evident purpose* * *is to prevent
legislative interference in matters which concern
alone the inhabitants of a given community."
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In State v. Eldredge, Supra, this court quoted this
Article of the Constitution as an exmnple of the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to provide "closer
adherence to local government* * *. Here is indicated an
intention to have local business transacted and local
affairs Inanaged and controlled by local authorities."
If this law were enforced and the counties were required to perform unifonnly throughout the county any
corporate function they undertook, double taxation which
is burdening the people in cities in Utah would be eliminated. No longer would city taxpayers be forced to pay
general county taxes which are used to pay for the
gathering of garbage in unincorporated areas and then,
have to pay city taxes to get their own garbage hauled.
The county would be required to gather garbage county
wide or desist entirely. Because double taxation results
in cheaper corporate ·services for unincorporated areas,
the people in compactly settled unincorporated areas
avoid incorporation and ask for more and more corporate county services. This creates a fertile ground for a
further breaking of the Constitution as in the instant
sewer case.
The corporate powers which involve property and
its effects are reserved for the administration of local
officers of each local self-governmental unit; for the
people in each village and ha1nlet to own, manage and
control the corporation they have voluntarily created and
they alone are responsible for the burdens they have
shouldered and they alone enjoy the benefits. The state
can regulate but it has no authority and is prohibited
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from creating "corporations for municipal purposes"
but "by general laws shall provid.e for the incorporation."
See Article XI #5, post.
The legislature and the county can regulate the local
corporations, but these state officers cannot appropriate
the wherewithal to perform the corporate functions. ~ir.
McQuillin in his Mun. Corpns. Vol. I (1st Ed.), in quoting
Judge Cooley in a leading case, at #168 p. 386, says:
"'It is a fundamental principle in this state,
recognized and perpetuated by express provisions
of the Constitution, that the people of every hamlet, town, and city of the state are entitled to the
benefits of local self-government. * * And when a
local convenience or need is to be supplied in
which the people of the state at large are not concerned, the state can no more by process of taxation take from the individual citizens the money to
purchase it than they could, if it had been procured, appropriate it to the state use.' People el
rei. Park Commissioners v. Common Co'llncil of
Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202."
The county commissioners and the legislature can
act only as an official arm of the state police power in
local areas. They have no authority to force the sewer
district upon the people involuntarily. The people have
had no voice in its creation nor in the appointment of its
officers. The political arm of the government has
usurped this corporate right of the people to local selfgovernment-the right to manage and control their own
affairs.

D.

The Sewer District as a Municipal Corporation.

As a municipal corporation is defined as having a
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"dual capacity, being a body politic and corporate" and
exercising "two kinds of powers, namely, public and
private," (McQuillin Ante), we must deterrnine if the
sewer district possesses the properties of a municipal
corporation. If the sewer district has the properties of
a municipal corporation, then to protect the liberties of
the people as intended by the framers of the Constitution
and to shield the people from the assumption of arbitrary
power by their government, the protective measures
taken by the people in forming their basic law regarding
municipal corporations must apply to the sewer district.
If these protective measures do not apply, then the people
are without a constitutional form of government and ar~
left totally at the mercy of a legislative assembly which
is subject to the influence of lobbyists and special privilege and "do-gooder" groups, and the great American
Experiment of rule by constitutional law to guarantee
individual liberty is ended. We may soon awaken to find
we have followed the pattern of history to our doom.
Safeguards are placed in constitutions to protect the
people and to insure an orderly and sound progress. It
is not progress when the initiative, the happiness and the
welfare of an individual is taken away and he is made
both slave and bankrupt.
That the sewer district possesses the properties of a
municipal corporation cannot be denied. It is a body
politic and a body corporate. It is an entity created to
serve a local, compactly settled area with a corporate
function for which cities and towns are created. It is
a local area incorporated to perform a special proprietary function. It possesses the police powers of the state
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in the operation of the properties "as are ordinarily
exercised by the governing body of a political subdivision." Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53, provides:

"* * * the board of trustees shall exercise all
powers and duties in the operation of the properties of the district as are ordinarily exercised
by the governing body of a political subdivision
* * adopt such regulations and by-laws * * as it
may see fit * * * have made an official seal * * *
have the right to sue and be sued, to enter into all
contracts which it may consider desirable for the
benefit of the district, and generally may do all
things and perform or cause to be performed all
acts which in its opinion are necessary or desirable
in the conduct of its affairs and in the operation
of the properties of the district.
"* * * not less than fifteen (15) days prior
to the date in each year on which the board of
county commissioners * * is to meet for the purpose of levying general county taxes, the board
of trustees of the district shall adopt and certify
to the county clerk a resolution specifying the
amount of taxes to be levied for such year on the
property of the district, and it shall be the mandatory duty of the board of county commissioners
* * to levy a tax for district purposes on all taxable property in the district situated within such
county at the rate specified in said resolution of
the board of trustees. Such taxes shall be extended
and collected in the manner provided by law for
the collection of general county taxes and the proceeds thereof shall as collected be turned over to
the treasurer of the district."
F'rom the above it can be seen that the sewer district
has the proprietary power to own and manage property
and is a body corporate and has the police power of the
state to levy taxes and is a body politic.
45
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The sewer district, then, has the dual capacity, the
characteristics, and the powers of a municipal corporation; therefore, it must be a municipal corporation. This
Court has recognized this self-evident truth by holding
a drainage district possessing these powers to be a
municipal corporation. In Elkins v. Millard County
Drwinage District #3, 77 Utah 303, 294 Pac. 307. At p.
318 of 77 Utah, this Court said:
"A drainage district is one form of municipal
corporation."
The legislature recognized this truth in writing the
Drainage District Act. Sec. 760-20, Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1907, provided :
"The organization of the district shall then
be complete, and said district shall thereafter constitute a municipal corporation with power to sue
and be 'Sued."
And also in writing the Water Conservancy Act.
Sec.l00-11-7, U.C.A.1943, provided:

"* * The Court * * shall declare the district
organized and give it a corporate name, * * and
thereupon the district shall be a political subdivision of the state of Utah and a body corporate
with all the powers of a public or municipal
corporation."
In the face of this, however, this Court proceeds to
conclude in Pattervck v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, Supra, that a water conservancy district is not a
municipal corporation. At p. 71 of 106 Utah, (Please note
that in quoting the above statute the words "municipal
corporation" were erroneously changed to "municipal
organization.") this Court said:
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"The Metropolitan Water District Act is
analogous in this respect to the Water Conservancy Act. The Water Conservancy Act contemplates organization of districts for a public purpose; that is, the control and conservation of
water which will benefit the community as a whole.
In this respect it is different from drainage and
irrigation districts which contemplate that benefits shall inure to particular lands. The Water
Conservancy District, when organized, is a public
agency. Sec. 100-11-7, U.C.A. 1943, provides that
when it is organized it '* * * shall be a political
subdivision of the state of Utah and a body corporate with all the powers of a public or municipal
organization.' "
Although this Court denies that the entities are
municipal corporations, it does recognize the vital and
important fact that a district organized for a purpose
"which will benefit the community as a whole * * * is
different from drainage and irrigation districts which
contemplate that benefits shall inure to particular lands."
The elective features of the Drainage District Act were
dropped from that act by the legislature, and emphasis
was placed upon the "due process clause" as a result of
the decision in the case of Argyle v. Johnson, Supra. See
Point 2, Ante. Yet, this hearing on whether one's property shall be benefited on a project "which will benefit
the community as a whole" is the only "voice" granted a
taxpayer in the creation and management of the sewer
district in the instant case. Sec. 17-6-3, Chapter 29, Laws
of Utah, 1953, provides :
"Any taxpayer within said district may on
or before said date so fixed protest against the
establishment of such district, in writing, * *. At
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the place and on the date and hour specified for
the hearing in the notice, * * the board of county
commissioners shall give full consideration to all
protests which may have been so filed and shall
hear all persons desiring to be heard and shall
thereafter adopt a resolution either creating the
district or determining that it shall not be created.
Any resolution so creating a district may contain
such changes as may be considered by the board
to be equitable and necessary, including changes
in the boundaries thereof to assure that the district shall contain no property which will not be
benefited by the proposed improvements."
Will a municipal sewer or municipal water system
improve the value of property~
The section continues:
"Any property owner who shall have filed a
written protest, * * * may within thirty (30) days
after the adoption of the resolution establishing
such district, apply to the district court * * for a
writ of review of the actions of the board of
County Commissioners in so establishing such
district, but only upon the ground that his property will not be benefited by the proposed improvements or upon the ground that the proceedings in establishing the district have not been in
compliance with the provisions of this statute."
Provisions similar to these are in the Drainage District Act and the Irrigation District Act because in those
cases it is possible that there can be lands within district
boundaries not susceptible to improvement. In the instant
case, however, a function is to be performed "which will
benefit the cominunity as a whole," and, therefore, this
provision has no legal meaning. To take from the people
the right to create and manage and control the corpora-
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tion, and take from them the right to vote for the "corporate authorities" and the right to the protections provided
in the Constitution for the corporate members of "a public agency or entity created for beneficial and necessary
public purposes" of a local community, and leave to the
people only the right to protest at a "mock" hearing and
trial, and hold this as "due process of law," is a travesty
upon justice !
Is not a city or town "a public agency or entity
created for beneficial and necessary public purposes~"
Are not all municipal corporations~
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra,
at p. 131 of 226 Pac. 2d, said:
"An improvement district * * is a separate
arm of the government formed for public purposes, * *."
What public purposes~ Proprietary purposes~
Political purposes~ Is it a separate poJitical arm of the
governmental police power~ Is it a county~ A town~
Does it have police powers like a city or town~ Does it
perform a local function like a city or town~
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna, further said at p.
132 of 226 Pac. 2d:
"It should be kept in mind that this Act was
enacted to provide for the creation of Improvement Districts wherever desired in the State, and
that these Districts, when formed, are quasi-_
municipalities, * * *. The governmental acts of
quasi-municipalities are like those of true municipalities, and when a muncipality acts within the
powers given it by statute, its acts are not subject
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to review by courts * * * See 62 C.J.S. Municipalities, Sec. 199."
And further at p. 140:
"An Improvement District, for instance, is
neither flesh, fish nor fowl. It is a partial city
or town-a quasi-municipality-in that it is set
up to attain limited benefits for the district to be
served, which benefits are those which an incorporated city or town could, within their debt limitations, accomplish. They are certainly part of
the functions a city or town is eminently fitted to
exercise and for which functions they are in part
constituted. * * *
"True, the same thing might be accomplished
if the inhabitants of the community would, instead
of causing an improvement district to be established, incorporate as a city or town as the case
might be. In that event, the territory encompassing the city or town would by incorporation be
taken out of the county. The Improvement District Act accomplished the same thing. * * ."
In other words, an improvement district has the
characteristics of a city or town, it has the powers of a
city or town, and it was created to perform the functions
of a city or town, but if it were defined a municipal corporation like a city or town, it would be unconstitutional;
therefore, in order that constitutional provisions can be
circumvented we must bury our heads in the sand and
define an improvement district as "neither flesh, fish nor
fowl." Thus liberty and free government are destroyed.
The Court, instead of guarding the Constitution, has
"implemented the legislation" to tear it to pieces. Lenin,
in prescribing for the downfall of free nations, advised
"to first confuse the vocabulary." Only by the perversion
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of the meaning of words can an improvement district be
said not to be a municipal corporation like a city or town.
Does the sewer district possess both police and proprietary powers~ If it has this dual power and character,
it is a municipal corporation. If it possesses the powers
of a city or town but is not a municipal corporation like
a city or town, then the constitutional protective guards
placed around a city or town do not apply and the
people are without a basic, protective law; and they can
be taxed without limit and thrown into debt without limit
and can be ruled by political agents of government who
have not been elected by the people who are so taxed
and so ruled; and free government as won by our forefathers and defined by our Constitution and, until
recently, by the Courts has been lost. The enemies of the
American Way of life have won.
The sewer district cannot be a separate political arm
of the government because the political subdivisions are
enumerated in the Constitution. Article XI #1, provides :
"The several counties of the Territory of
Utah, existing at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, are hereby recognized as legal subdivisions of this State, and the precincts, and
school districts, now existing in said counties, as
legal subdivisions thereof, and they shall so continue until changed by law in pursuance of this
article."
In those states where the constitution does not define the civil divisions, such as counties, the legislatures
have authority to create "separate arms of the government." Our Constitution framers saw fit to limit and
define the civil divisions of this State and to take from
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the legislature the power to create and change them.
Some of the delegates to the constitutional convention
complained that the legislature would have nothing left
for it to do because the Constitution was providing for
everything. The Constitution of Utah is one of the best
in the United States and is a bulwark of protection for
individual liberty and freedom. The right to local selfgovernment and the protection of basic rights associated
therewith permeates the entire document.
The sewer district which has both the governmental
and proprietary powers is a municipal corporation, and
it is as difficult to avoid admitting this truth as it is to
ignore a mountain in our pathway around which a devious detour must be taken. That is why the Court admitted in the Tygesern v. Magna case that an improvement
district is "a partial city or town."
At the Constitutional convention a motion was made
to strike the words "or other municipal corporation"
from Article XIV #4. This section reads in part :

"* * No county shall become indebted to an
.amount * * exceeding two per centum. No city,
town, school district or 'other municipal corporation shall become indebted, * * exceeding four per
centum * *."
Mr. Thurman speaking against this motion at p.
1135, Vol. II, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, said:
"Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to striking out
'.or other municipal corporation' and it ought not
to have been struck out of the section that we
struck it out of in the revenue act, because there

52
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

may be municipal corporations not included in
these names specified. For instance, a village is
not included at all. Now, what harm does that
do~ And it certainly saves any possible munici.,
pal corporation that exists now or that may hereafter be created."
The term was later reinserted in Article XIII #5.
What possible municipal corporations did the framers have in mind~ A village is defined in 20 C.J.S.
Counties, p. 757:
"A county is distinguished from a village in
that a county is an involuntary subdivision of the
state created .by the state for governmental purposes, whereas a village is a voluntary corporation
organized by the action of its own inhabitants for
their own local benefit." Citing Nassau County
v. Lincer, Supra.
It was argued in the convention that the terms
enumerated without specifying "or other municipal corporations" covered all possible contingencies. At that
time the term "town" was thought adequate to cove-r any
and all municipal corporations, but the framers wanted
to leave no possible loop-hole or misinterpretation of
words or of intent whereby schemers could plot to usurp
the corporate powers of local areas and take away the
liberty of the people.
As to what the term "town" meant, Vol. I McQuillin
Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.) #108, p. 252, says:
"The words, municipal corporations, have
been held to include cities and villages and any
other municipal corporation strictly so called. * *
Towns are often called in common parlance, and
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sometimes unguardedly in statutes, municipal corporations in connection with counties, cities and
villages; but ordinarily when so called it is in a
sense of mere corporations, or quasi-corporations
or of corporations sub-modo only. * * * The word
* *town** is often commonly employed to designate places incorporated for local government
under special acts, but not clothed with all the
powers usually conferred on cities."
This definition of a town would include an IInprovement District as defined by this Court in Tygesen v.
Magna Water Company, Supra. At the time our Constitution was formed, a town was a quasi-municipality. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Part II, Chapter XII, Section
1819S1 through 1824S6, authorized "a majority of the
taxpayers .of any town having a population of not less
than 300 may incorporate." A board of five trustees (including one President) were elected by the townspeople
and then they were commissioned by the Governor. The
powers of the town were very limited. They could regulate affairs which took but little money and could perform no corporate functions which required the inhabitants to go into debt. They could have special deputies,
regulate stray animals, dogs, travelling shows, build sidewalks, etc. They could not tax in any year an amount
exceeding one fourth of one percent, unless voted by two
thirds of the electors at a called special meeting, then not
to exceed on half of one percent. If any municipal functions were desired which required larger amounts of
money, the community had to apply to the Territorial
Legislature for a charter and become a full municipality;
that is, a full municipality for the special functions for
which they applied. Some areas wanted a water works,
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some a sewer, etc., and the local areas were dotted with
special charters. When the State was formed special
charters were eliminated by the Constitution mandating
that the areas would be governed by general laws. This
will be argued in Section E Post.
In Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.)
#108, footnote, p. 264, it says:

"* * What is embraced in the term municipal
corporation largely depends upon the manner in
which it is used and the proper construction to be
given to it in the particular constitution or law
where employed. * * Usually words as employed
in public laws are received in their strict constitutional sense unless the intention in the given
case was to invest them with a more extended signification."
And in #131, p. 304 :
"The word 'town' is commonly used to include
almost every character of municipal government
from a city to a village or hamlet, embracing the
whole range of bodies corporate, less than counties, established for local government."
It was because the term "town" was thought to cover
every contingency that the motion was made by the
framers of the Constitution to strike the words "or other
municipal corporations." The term was left in the constitution to make absolutely certain that "any possible
municipal corporation that exists now or that may hereafter be created" would be included.

Article XIII #5, Constitution of Utah, provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal corporation, * * *."
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A county is a quasi-municipality and is enumerated
along with a city; between these two grades of municipal
corporations, lie all public corporations. As the word
"town" and the term "other municipal corporation" is
mentioned, every possible public corporation is included
in this section of the Constitution. This proves without
a question of a doubt, that the framers intended to protect the citizens in every particular from the assumption
of arbitrary power by their government; that they intended to include all voluntary and involuntary public
corporations.
By every definition, by the intention of the framers
of the Constitution, by every legal and reasonable conclusion, and by the fundamental principles of free government, the Sewer District is a municipal corporation within the meaning of those sections of the Constitution of
Utah where the terms "town" or "other municipal corporation" are used.

E. Limits of Legislatirve Control.
This brings us to a consideration of whether the
legislature has exceeded its authority in creating the Salt
Lake City Suburban Sanitary District and delegating to
it power to tax without limit and without representation,
to perform a local corporate function, and to exceed debt
limitations; and whether general laws which provide for
incorporating compactly settled communities and their
regulation have been ignored. The delegating of the
police power to local areas to perform local corporate
functions, upon the initiative and choice of the inhabitants, is a fundamental principle of free government and,
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to insure that adequate protective measures are taken to
keep it voluntary and free, the Constitution mandates
that the legislature provide for the incorporation of local
areas by general laws and prohibits the state political
power from creating such public corporations by legislative fiat.
The county and the legislature can exercise compulsory authority in state affairs only. They have no
authority to force the sewer district upon the people in
the district without the vote of the people in the district.
The legislature has no authority to interfere in local
corporate affairs. The authority of the state police power
is limited to public afairs - the body politic side of a
public corporation. Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.) #166, p. 383, says:
"In matters of public concern, such as relate
to the performance of functions by the municipal
corporation as the agent of the state, the legislature is not limited to conferring a discretionary
power, but may exercise compulsory authority,
where the local officers or agencies neglect or
refuse to discharge their duty * * *. Touching
duties which the people in the several localities
owe to the state at large, it is manifest, they cannot be allowed a discretionary authority to perform them or not as they may choose, for as
tersely stated by Judge Cooley, 'Such an authority
would be wholly inconsistent with anything like
regular or uniform government in the state.'
People ex rel. v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228."
The state can regulate public affairs such as the time
and manner of holding elections, the manner of uniformly
assessing property, regulating the courts, protecting the
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health as explained hereinbefore, etc., and if the municipal corporation does not perform these state functions
as prescribed by the general laws, the state, through its
authorized agents, can exercise compulsory authority.
The state, however, cannot use its police power to appropriate the corporate property nor the means to acquire
it, this is reserved for local self-government.
McQuillin at #168, p. 386, continues:
"As we have seen, a municipal corporation is
in part a public agency of the state, and in part
it is possessed o.f local franchises and rights which
pertain to it as a legal personality or entity for
its quasi-private (as distinguished from public)
corporate advantage.
"The general doctrine as to the limitation of
legislative control is clearly expressed by Judge
Cooley in a leading case. He says: "The proposition which asserts the amplitude of legislative
control over municipal corporations, when confined, as it should be, to such corporations as
agencies of the State in its government, is entirely
sound. They have other objects and purposes
peculiarly local, and in which the state at large,
except in conferring the power and regulating its
exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in
the individual and private concerns .of its several
citizens* * *. It is a fundamental principle in this
state, recognized and perpetuated by express provisions of the Constitution, that the people of
every hamlet, town, and city of the state are
entitled to the benefits of local self-government.
* * * The right of the State is a right of regulation,
not of appropriation. * * * And when a local convenience or need is to be supplied in which the
people of the state at large are not concerned, the
state can no more by process of taxation take

58
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the individual citizens the money to purchase
it than they could, if it had been procured, appropriate it to the state use. * * From the very dawn
of our liberties the principle most unquestionable
of all has been this : that the people shall vote the
taxes they are to pay, or be permitted to choose
representatives for the purpose.' People ex Rel.
Park Commissioners v. Common Council of
Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202."
The state, the legislature and the county can regulate
local corporate functions and define the extent and nature
of such functions, but the police power cannot be used to
create, manage and operate and levy taxes for these
functions, without the vote of the people and their direct
participation.
The general rule of legislative power to create corporations to aid in the administration of public affairs
was stated by this Court in Lehi City v. Meiling, Supra.
At p. 263 of 87 Utah, this Court said:
"The general rule is that stated by Mr. McQuillin in 1 McQuillin Municipal Corporations
(2 Ed.) 387: 'In the absence of constitutional limitations the state legislature may create any kind
of a corporation to aid in the administration of
public affairs and endow such corporation and its
officers with such powers and functions as it may
deem necessary.'"
The court then proceeds to turn its hack upon the
Constitution, and not only ignore the fact that .lMr.
McQuillin is referring to the purely governmental public
corporation, but apply the reference to the proprietary
powers. That Mr. McQuillin never so intended is plainly
discernible by referring to the chapter from which the
above reference was taken.
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Mr. McQuillin even questions the right to unlimited
control of the governmental side when not limited by
constitutional provisions. Yol. I McQuillin :Municipal
Corporations (2d Ed.) #188, pages 545 and 546, says:
"It is difficult to accept in its entirety the
doctrine of absolute unlimited legislative control,
if the view should be adopted which is undoubtedly
historically correct, that local self-government of
the municipal corporation does not spring from,
nor exist by virtue of, written constitutions, nor
is it a mere privilege conferred by the central
authority. The fact is, as repeatedly pointed out,
that the people of the various organized communities exercise their rights of local self-government
under the protection of these fundamental principles which were accepted, without doubt or question, when the several constitutions were promulgated.
"Therefore, it appears clear that in a government in which the legislative power of state is not
omnipotent, and in which it is axiomatic that local
self-government is not a mere privilege, but a
matter of absolute political right, the existence of
unlimited authority in the state does not exist.
Graham v. Fresno, 151 Cal. 465, 91 Pac. 147,
Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343, State ex rei. v.
Barker 89 N.W. 204 (Ia.), People ex rei. v. Detroit, 29 Mich. 108, People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44, Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steel, 49
Pac. 382 (Mont.) Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S.
358."
This fundamental principle was well expressed by
this Court in State v. Eldredge, Supra, and in State v.
Standfor'd, Supra. See quotes Ante. Not only is the doctrine of unlimited legislative control repugnant to the
fundamental principles of a free government, but it is
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expressly limited by the Utah State Constitution 1n
several of its Articles as follows:
( 1). The purely governmental divisions of the sta,te
are fixed.

Article XI #1, Supra, takes from the legislature the
power to create counties. This section also takes from
the legislature the authority to create or change the
school districts and precincts. There was a concerted
fight at the Constitutional Convention to leave the legislature a free hand, but the framers saw fit to provide
constitutional limitations on the legislative power. Gan
the Sewer District be a separate political subdivision of
the state like a county~ It is not like a county; it is like
a town.
(2). Local areas to be incorporated by genera.Z laws.

Incorporation by special laws forbidden.
Article VI #26 prohibits the legislature from incorporating local areas by special laws. Part (12) provides :
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cases:
(12) Incorporating cities, towns or villages: * * ."
Art. XI #5, mandates that local areas shall be incorporated by general laws:
"Corporations for municipal purposes shall
not be created by special laws. The Legislature
by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities and
towns in proportion to population, which laws may
be altered, amended or repealed. * *."
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The state is to provide for the incorporation. It is
prohibited from moving into a local area and incorporating it by resolution of one of its governmental agents.
In the widely quoted case of People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44, it was held that the act was confined to directing;
"that in thus directing, their power is exhausted."
A general law must have uniform operation throughout the class. Any municipal corporation created must
take the steps required in the general laws. The general
laws of incorporation in the state leave entirely to the
initiative of the people the voluntary creation of the city
or town, and the steps taken in incorporating a city or
town are uniformly administered throughout the state.
This is a protection for the people. When a compactly
settled area needs a municipal function like a sewer and
the promoters desire to incorporate in a different way
from the general laws which provide for the incorporation of compactly settled areas like cities or towns, the
promoters of the particular areas apply to the legislature
for special consideration or charter or franchise or call
it what you will. In these cases the members of the legislature who are not involved do not always exert the diligence that is necessary to guard fundamental rights of
the people. This idea was well expressed by Mr. Evans
(Weber) at the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Y ol. I, Page 402:

"* * * the Legislature is composed of people
from all over the territory. They look after the
interests of each particular section of the Territory, and if a few people were to go into the Legislature desiring a certain charter for Salt Lake
City, and the people outside of Salt Lake City not
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being interested at all in it, would say, 'All right,
you can have just such a charter as you want:' the
charter given to Salt Lake may not be the character of a charter that the people of Salt Lake want,
although its representatives may be working for it.
But when we make them all uniform and classify
them, then there certainly can be no danger * * ."
General laws must be uniform. If one area has a
sewer all areas should have complied with the same procedural steps described in the general laws. If not, the
law is not general and uniform. Chap. 29, Laws of Utah
1953, is a special law because it permits the county commissioners to incorporate a local area "upon its own motion," and to appoint themselves the governing board of
the corporation. This is contrary to the provisions of the
general laws for incorporating local areas. The framers
of the Constitution to make sure that the provisions of
the Constitution would not be circumscribed provided
in Art. I #24: "All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation."
Vol. I Dillon Mun. Corpns. (5th Ed.) #143, p. 260,
says:
"In those states in which the Constitutions
simply prohibit the enactment of local or special
legislation upon specified subjects without any
specific requirement that laws of a general nature
shall have a unifor1n operation, it * * * is a simple
prohibition of special legislation (and) is not a
requirement that the laws shall he uniform or have
a uniform operation."
Judge Dillon continues that jurisdictions have proceeded to pass special legislation and it has been declared
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valid. In #144 and #145, he says that where the Constitution requires uniform operation, it is mandatory.
A general law having uniform operation must operate upon all throughout the class of the lawmaking
body. The general laws of incorporation apply to the entire State. Towns and cities are created to perform municipal functions. The sewer district was created to perform
one of these functions. If one method leaves to the initiative of the people in the area to be incorporated the exercise of the secret ballot for officers and for the creation,
and another method takes from the people these fundamental rights, can we still stay that the general laws providin-g for the creation have been complied with and that
they are uniformly administered~
The extent and nature of the functions a city or town
is permitted to perform are defined in the general laws
pertaining to the class. Cities and towns are classified
after they are created and general laws applying to that
class then apply. To what class does the special municipal function of providing a sewer apply~ Does it apply
to a county~ To what class does the sewer district be·long~ The sewer district was created within arbitrarily
drawn lines within the unincorporated area of a county
by resolution of the County Commissioners. Can a law
be made to apply to a part of the unincorporated area of
a county and still be considered to apply to all of the
class~ In Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800 (Minn.1887),
the court said, p. 801 :
"The authorities are agreed that a law
general in its form, but special in its operation,
violates a constitutional inhibition of special legis-
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lation as much as though special in form; and they
are also agreed that, for the purpose of applying
different rules to different subjects, the legislature cannot adopt a mere arbitrary classification.
To permit that would open the door to a complete
evasion of the Constitution. * * * In determining
whether a law be general or special, courts will
look, not to its form and phraseology merely, but
to its substance and necessary operation. A law is
general and uniform in its operation which operates equally upon all the subjects within the class
of subjects for which the rule is adopted; but,
as we have said, the legislature cannot adopt a
mere arbitrary classification, even though the law
be made to operate equally upon each subject of
each of the classes adopted. State v. Hammer, 42
N J Law 435."
In Groves v. Grant Cournty, 26 S.E. 460 (W.Va.), at
P. 463, the court said:
"Special laws are those made for individual
cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances; local laws are special as to place. See
Suth. St. Const. #127, citing State v. Wilcox, 45
Mo. 458. A general law is that which relates to
a whole class of persons, places, relations, or
things grouped according to some specified class
characteristic, binding all within the jurisdiction
of the lawmaking power, limited as that power
may be by its territorial operation or by constitutional restraint. * * * A general or public act is
a universal rule that regards the whole community.' 1 Bl. Com. 86."
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953 is a special law because it provides for the creation of a municipal corporation in a special way and it provides for a local corpo-

65
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rate function in only a part of the unincorporated area
of a county class.
(3) Creat.ion of corporations and the delegation of
authority to corporat~ons to perform special m.unicipal
functions forbidden.
The legislature is prohibited from providing for the
incorporation of any areas to perform any municipal
functions except towns and cities. That a sewer project is
a municipal function cannot be denied. It is a function
that is needed in compactly settled communities only.
A sewer is enumerated as a municipal function in Article
XIV #4, Post, of the Constitution of Utah. It is one of
the greatest and most important functions a city or town
performs.
In Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (2nd
Ed.) #339, municipal functions are classified. The building of sewers, collection of garbage, furnishing of water,
gas, electricity, railways, etc., are classified as municipal
functions.
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra,
at p. 140, said:
"An Improvement District * * * is a partial
city or town * * * it is set up to attain limited benefits for the district to be served. * * * They are
certainly part of the functions a city or town is
eminently fitted to exercise and for which functions they are in part constituted."
To say that a public corporation is not performing
a municipal function in furnishing any of the above services because it is not a city is a pure evasion and perversion of the meaning of words.
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Article XI #5, provides: "Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. * * ."
That the Sewer District is a corporation created for
municipal purposes cannot be denied.
The general laws provide for the incorporation and
define the extent and nature of the corporate functions,
but they do not create the corporation to perform any
one special function. The incorporators themselves, upon
their own voluntary decisions, determine which and how
many of the functions authorized by the general laws
shall be performed; and the decision is independent of
the political powers of the state. One town may desire to
purchase electric power from a public utility; another
may wish to own its own power plant. One city may want
a sewer; another a water system, etc. Another may want
to own and furnish all local services which are authorized
and in addition may importune the legislature to enlarge
and extend the general laws, or if failing in that, to obtain
a special franchise in the guise of a general law as
in the instant case. It is a common and fatal tendency
of men and governments to extend and enlarge the corporate functions of government until the state becomes
a paternal agency to furnish those services which the
people can better serve themselves through private enterprise. When the government furnishes all the corporate
services for its people, socialism is complete.
It was to eliminate special charters, whereby a community could perform a special function, that the framers
of the Constitution intended by Article XI #5. At the
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. I,
Mr. Evans (Weber), speaking against a motion to strike
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from this section the words "Corporations for municipal
purposes shall not be created by special laws, but," at p.
402, said:
".Mr. Chairman, I run in favor of the section
as it stands. I know that if you strike that out,
there will be frequent importunities upon the part
of small villages to the Legislature to have special
charters. I do not think we ought to do that. I do
not think we ought to permit it."
A comparison of this intent with the opinion of this
court in Tygesen 1.:. Magna Water Co., Supra, indicates
how far we have drifted from the intent of the framers,
the provisions of the Constitution and the fundamental
principles of free government. At p. 136 of 226 Pac. 2d,
this Court said:
"Of course, there is common to the constitutions of all districts permitted by law the fact
that they are districts-that is, that they are confined to certain areas, and that the functioning of
each is related to that area. That is why the word
'district' always appears in their title". And common to the objective of forming districts is the
principle of democratic cooperation by a majority
in number of property value for the purposes to
be subserved by the district. But the purposes of
each may vary considerably and consequently the
nature of the functions and the way they are constituted correspondingly vary according to the
purposes to be effectuated. Its governing body
and the procedure by which it may be constituted
will likewise be fashioned to effectuate those purposes and functions. * * * Necessity being the
mother of invention, Acts are prompted by the
particular necessities of certain areas whereas another area Inay require a more grandiose plan.
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The outstanding purpose common to all these laws
is to permit communities and individuals to do
things together, to cooperate for their common
benefit through organization established under
law. It is simply an application of the pervasive
principle of cooperation."
This describes clearly the special charter cases the
framers of the Constitution prohibited. Improvement districts use the police power to provide a municipal function, and it was to control the misuse of this power and
protect the people from the assumption of arbitrary
power by their government that Article XI #5 and Article
VI #26 were written. In fact, it is the reason for having
a Constitution. In the instant sewer district case, the
"pervasive principle of cooperation" is the "cooperation"
asked for and used by embryonic tyrants.
(4).

Right of the power to tax is limited.

In Harward v. St. Clair Drain Co., Supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois at p. 135 of 51 Ill., said:
"The power of taxation is, of all the powers
of government, the one most liable to abuse, even
when exercised by the direct representatives of the
people, and if committed to persons who may exercise it over others without reference to their consent, the certainty of its abuse would be simply a
question of time. No person or class of persons
can be safely entrusted with irresponsible power
over the property of others, and such a powers is
essentially despotic in its nature, and violative of
all just principles of government. It matters not
that, as in the present instance, it is to be professedly exercised for public uses, by expending
for the public benefit the tax collected. If it be a
tax * * * imposed by persons acting under no re-
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sponsibility of official position, and Clothed with
no authority of any kind, by those whom they
propose to tax, it is, to the extent of such tax, misgovernment of the same character which our forefathers thought just cause of revolution."
Article XIII #5, Constitution of Utah, provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in
the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the
power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes
of such corporation."
As to whom the "corporate authorities" are has been
argued in Point 2 Ante. That the sewer district is a
"municipal corporation" within the purview of this section cannot be denied and is argued in Part C. Only by
ignoring plain and simple words in the Constitution can
the court conclude as it did in Tygesen v. Magna Water
Co., Supra. At p. 133 of 226 Pac. 2d, this court said:
"See Patterick v. Water Conservancy Dist.,
supra, wherein this court pointed out that a district could have been created by legislative fiat
had the legislature so desired, since the creation
of a district does not affect property rights, and
since the legislature could have created the district
by its own fiat it could have provided for a tax
on all property within the district to pay for the
costs and maintenance of the project * *."
Art. VI #26, part (8) prohibits the legislature from
"assessing and collecting taxes."
This philosophy of government that legislatures are
supreme as expressed in the :Magna ease is a popular
trend in the thinking of people today. Whether it has
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been taught in the schools or whether it is a fad acquired
by a lethal lapse in thinking, matters not; it is entirely
foreign to the American Way of Life and a constitutionally free people. If the legislative acts are the supreine
law of the land, then the Constitution is subordinate
thereto, and men have succeeded in putting themselves
above that sacred law. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.)
p. 431, says:
"It is entirely correct, also, in assuming that a
legislative enactment is not necessarily the law of
the land. 'The words "by the law ·of the land" as
used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute
passed for the purpose of working the wrong.
That construction would render the restriction
absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the
Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would
be made to say to the two houses; "You shall be
vested with the legislative power of the State,
but no one shall be disfranchised or deprived of
any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless
you pass a statute for that purpose. In other
words, you shall not do the wrong unless you
choose to do it."' Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140."
Taxation without limit and without representation
is permitted in the sewer district. See Point 2 Ante.
( 5)

Debt limitations are provided.

Art. XIV #4 specifically recognizes a sewer as a
municipal function and provides a debt limit for that important and expensive corporate function in compactly
settled communities. That the sewer district is a municipal corporation within the purview of this section of
the Constitution has been argued hereinbefore. The
framers of the Constitution were "debt conscious" and
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they placed limitations upon the new State and all subdivisions thereof in every particular. They meant to protect the people and especially future generations from excessive governmental expenditures and the resulting debt
burdens and ruinous taxation that goes therewith. Mr.
Varian, speaking on this subject, at p. 1000, Vol. I, said:
"Are you willing to reach down into the future and pilfer from the pockets of posterity, the
thrift and industry of that generation? Are you
willing to lay a lien upon the property of those
who are to come after you? I say you have no
right to do it* * *. It is better, Mr. President that
the people make haste slowly. It is better that
they grow not with a too rapid growth. There
are evils attendant upon this sort of financial
mislegislation that cannot be calculated * *."
A sewer in the present district could be built in units
with small treatment plants strategically located. At a
later date when required and it is economically feasible,
the proposed colossal treatment plant and the enormous
trunk lines could be added. It has been argued that we
must build for the future. This writer agrees but we
should not overbuild. It has been argued that if any part
needs replacement later, then we are wasting labor and
materials. Did the pioneers waste their labor and materials building log cabins ? Did someone blunder because an old, inadequate office building must be torn
down to make way for a larger one? If this is so, the
present Continental National Bank Building should have
been built by the first one who built a business establishment on that corner. Have the economic laws been
abridged? If we exceed constitutional debt limits we
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are overbuilding. The framers of the Constitution recognized that it is more economically sound and feasible to
"grow not with a too rapid growth."
It has been a lesson learned from bitter experience
that the power to levy taxes and create debt upon property is liable to serious abuse unless held in check and
controlled. Vol. I Dillon Mun. Corpns. (5th Ed.) #190,
p. 336, says:
"The power to create debt including the
power to issue negotiable long time bonds, and
the power to levy taxes and assessments are the
powers which experience has shown to be
especially liable to serious abuse * *. The proneness to incur indebtedness, especially if its burden can be thrown upon posterity, is well known,
and needs, in the interest of the public welfare, to
be regulated and restricted."
Majorities will usually vote for the schemes of promoters who promise to provide the necessities of life
on silver platters at bargain prices with deferred payments. In recounting the experience of Ogden voting to
borrow money from the United States Government, Mr.
Evans (Weber), at p. 1140 of the Proceedings, said :
"Why, Ogden had no difficulty in voting for
eight per cent at the time we wanted to borrow
this money. They were unanimous in favor of it
under the circumstances. And that is just the
craze that reaches men's minds. It has reached
mine. I understand it. I profit by the experience,
and I would put a limitation in the Constitution
prohibiting people going crazy under those circumstances. * * There would be such a limitation
that though one citizen remained sane, he could
go into the courts and say, "you cannot exceed
this constitutional limit * * ."
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A majority of the people in the sewer district voted
for a bond :dsue which exceeds Constitutional limits.
They did not realize that the revenue issue was a general
obligation upon property the same as taxes; however,
they did vote for an enormous and unreasonable debt.
This craze of the people to go into debt was known and
the framers of the Constitution made provisions to protect the minorities when majorities in local areas stop
thinking and accept blindly the schemes of promoters
which take away the basic liberties of the people. Schemes
are planned to circumvent constituti('nal limits because
it is difficult to raise debt limits in constitutions by
amendment. The majority of the people in the state
tend to protect the minorities in local areas. This is also
the fundamental principle underlying the general law
and uniform operation requirements.
In affirming a decision of the Iowa Supreme Court,
wherein a majority of the voters of Council Bluffs had
voted to create a debt and the constitutional debt limit
was being considered, the U. S. Circuit Ct., in Nash v.
Council Bluffs, 174 F'ed.182, at p.184, said:
"It is idle to talk about what majority some
scheme has received. This provision of the Constitution was adopted for the sole purpose of
thwarting majorities, and giving protection to a
minority. * * * The craze to go in debt, with the
stock argmnent for the future generation to help
pay the debts, as if they will not have enough of
their own creation, is and has been ever present.
Seldom is any scheme to be followed by a debt
for any purpose voted down. The convention of
1857 knew this. Counties and cities in Eastern
Iowa had then gone In debt in extravagently
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large amounts for different things, for the supposed public good. Those schemes were supported
by the same zeal and enthusiasm as are the
schemes of paternalism of the present day. * *
Debts created by Eastern Iowa Counties and
Cities, before the adoption of the constitution
more than fifty years ago, are still being paid
by the future generations-the present taxpayers
* *. These were the evils that the constitution was
to strike down. * * ."
F'rom the foregoing argument of Section E, it can
be seen that the legislature and the state political power
is limited and circumscribed in several particulars in
the State of Utah. The framers of the Constitution
emphasized that they meant no exceptions by writing
Art. I #26 which states:
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words
they are declared to be othe-rwise."
Because schemers have employed devious methods
whereby constitutional prohibitons are circumvented and
because all of these schemes by their nature tend to a
move away from decentralization of power toward centralization of power, it has become the popular trend to
transfer more and 1nore of the purely local corporate
functions to state created organizations. This tendency
has been ever present in free governments and has been
the ultimate cause of the downfall of free governments.
Mr. McQuillin in his Vol. 1 Municipal Corpns. (2d Ed.)
#185, p. 534, in commenting on the trend of legislatures
to transfer to the State much of the purely local matters
which are reserved for local self-government, said:
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"It is obvious that a question of this character, as remarked by Judge Cooley, who has given
this subject profound study, is of the highest
practical interest and concern, 'which cannot be
answered without a careful scrutiny of the structure of our government and an exmnination of the
principles which underlie free institutions in
America.' He characterized such legislation 'as
a blow aimed at the foundation of our structure
of liberty,' and that when the state thus 'reaches
out and draws to itself and appropriates the
powers which from time immemorial have been
locally possessed and exercised, and introduces
into its legislation the centralizing ideas of Continental Europe, under which despotism, whether
of monarch or commune, alone has flourished, we
seemed forced back upon and compelled to take
up and defend the plainest and most primary
axioms of free government.' People v. Hurlbut,
24 Mich. 44, People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (NY)
325."
In the instant case, agents of the State political
power have appointed themselves the corporate officers
of the district. The trustees are granted the authority
to tax without limit. The people of the corporation are
' denied the right of Article IV Section 8 to an election
by the secret ballot for the officers. Taxation without
representation is permitted. The corporate rights of
local self-government are usurped by a political arm of
the State government. Constitutional debt limits are
ignored and greatly exceeded. The people in the district
are reduced to mere puppets to do the will and bidding
of political agents of the State.
If this sort of despotism is permitted by the courts,
then the Constitution has been emasculated and torn to
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shreds and no longer exists. Individual, constitutional
rights are in grave jeopardy and should be declared. If
these rights are circumvented and ignored, then the Constitution is dead and individual man is again reduced
to the status of a slave by his government.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has gone to considerable lengths to convince the Court that the special district laws have departed from the fundamental principles of free government to an extent that threaten and place in jeopardy
the whole foundation of free government. Appellant submits that these vital issues have not been before the Court
in the special district cases, or, if so, have been only in
"friendly" suits and have not been adequately or properly controverted.
This Court was "split" in the Lehi City v. Me~ling
case when a devious, unconstitutional course was agreed
upon. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Wolfe
in his supplementing opinion which is pure dicta. Mr.
Justice Moffat in the dissenting opinion, at p. 286 of 87
Utah, said:
"The mere asking of a writ of mandate requiring a Ininisterial officer to perform an ordinary duty incident to his office pursuant to the
action of the governing board of a city is one
thing. The dropping into the lap of the court a
complex and complicated statute of over a half
hundred sections and without definite issues or
expressed or intended applications of the principles of law involved or any stated facts, circum-
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stances, or conditions to which the law is proposed to be applied, and ask the court to pa:ss
upon the validity of the whole legal, and anticipated factual and contractual possible set-ups
that may grow out of the situation, is quite another, and is not quite fair to the court and may
result in embrassment * * when a crucial situation arises out of the complications which are
sure to arise and later present themselves. No
attempt is made to present or limit issues. The
declaratory judgments act is not involved."
Action in the Tygeson v. Magna Water Co. case upon
which legal opinion respondents have leaned heavily,
was brought by a plaintiff who said in his Brief at pages
17-19, Vol. 611, Briefs, #7550:
"Magna has a sewer system and disposal
plant, garbage collection, street lights, street
maintenance, fire and police protection * * a
county recreation program all furnished by Salt
Lake County. * * In fact, Magna has practically
all services furnished under city government except self rule. * * Plaintiff agrees that the need
for improved water is urgent, and the program
of the defendants is commendable. * * It is Plaintiff's position that the present trend is away from
incorporating into cites and towns, and vesting
more and more power in county governments,
commissioners, and boards, to furnish needed
facilities to unincorporated areas. Plaintiff conceedes that the very purpose of the law now being
considered in this proceedings was to permit
unincorporated areas of the state to obtain adequate water and sewer facilities for their communities without being required to incorporate.
Plaintiff makes no arguments against the advisability of such a trend."
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In the instant case the whole argument is to save
local self-government; to save to the individual the rights
to the protections placed in the constitution around
incorporated towns and villages; to stop unincorporated,
compactly settled communities from capitaliizng upon the
unconstitutional procedure of "double taxation" of the
tax burdened incorporated cities and towns. If the condition continues which the plaintiff in the Magna case
eulogizes, then the constitutions and the magna chartas
mean no more than the public documents in the lands of
the dictators.
At pages 20-21, the plaintiff continues:
"Plaintiff is his own attorney in this matter,
not so much from a matter of choice, as expediency. He feels that the court shold know that as
a resident of the community of Magna and as an
attorney, he has for years worked with civic
groups and other attorneys on legislation that
would permit the community of Magna to own its
own water system without incorporation. In this
connection Plaintiff has actively participated in
preparing this law and the law it replaced and
lobbied for the passage of both laws. After this
law was passed, plaintiff actively participated in
the necessary steps leading up to the creation of
the defendant Water Company and the bond election. In fact, Plaintiff anticipates a substantial
legal fee for services rendered, conditioned on this
court holding this law constitutional.
"* * Plaintiff can only agree that the trend
of the courts and the legislature toward vesting
more and more authority in these 'quasi-municipal corporations' is salutory."
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The controversy was so "thin" in the Magna case
that even this Court, at p. 141 of 226 Pac. 2d, complained:
"What we really are asked to do in these cases
involving bond issues is to give a declaratory
judgment a:s to validity and constitutionality. The
issues should be, if possible, truly adversarial and
not a friendly proceeding on fictitious or artificially made issues."
Should a question involving important public rights,
extending through all cOining time, be conclusively decided on such fictitious and artifically made issues and
brought by a plaintiff with a viewpoint which could only
lead to no argument~ Should a decision so obtained rate
"stare decisis~" Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) Ch. 4,
p. 62, says:
"A party is concluded by a judgment against
him from disputing its correctnes'S, so far as the
point directly involved in the case was concerned
* * but if strangers who have no interest in the
subject matter are in like manner concluded * *
we shall be met by the query, whether we are not
concluding parties by decisions which others have
obtained in fictitious controversies and by collusion, or have suffered to pass without sufficient
consideration and discussion, and which might
perhaps have been given otherwise had other parties had an opportunity of being heard."
And further at p. 66 :
"It will of course sometimes happen that a
court will find a former decision so unfounded in
law, so unreasonable in its deductions or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled
to disregard it. Footnote: 'We are by no means
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unmindful of the salutary doctrine of the rule
''stare decisis," but at the saine time we cannot
be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own
consciousness, as well as hy judicial history, of
the liability to error and the advantages of revie\\·.' Per Smitli, J. in Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis.
G03; And see l~neeland v. l\1 ilwaukee, 15 Wis. -1-G-1-;
Taylor v. French, H) Yt. -!9; Bellows v. Parsons,
13 N.I-I. ~5(); Hannel v. Smith, 1:) Ohio 134; Day
v. ~Lunson, 1-l: Ohio St. 488; Harrow v. Myers, :29
Ind. 4G9 ~ Paul v. Davis 100 Ind. -1-2~; Linn v.
~Linor, -! ~ ev. -1-():2 ~ \Villis v. Owens, -t:~ Texas,
-±1; * *."
Appellant submits that an Improvement District
which is organi~ed to furnish a eorporate function for a
compactly settled counnunit~· which is a benefit to the
entire community and not to certain lands only, and is
a function for which eities and towns are created to provide, is a municipal corporation within the purview of the
Constitution. --:\ppellant submits that the contrary holding in the ~[agna ease was in error and asks the Court
to re-examine the· law; that a function is performed in
a local community which ean only legally be performed
by a cit~· or town incorporated under the general laws.
Appellant submits that the revenue bond program of the
sewer district is outside the special fund doctrine and
creates a debt.
Appellants asks this Court to declare his constitutional right to vote for th<> "corporate authorities" of a
public corporation who have the power to tax and assess
appellant's property. ApJwllant asks this Court to declare· his right to constitutional protection from unlimited
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and excessive and ruinous tax and debt burdens. These
basic and vital rights are now in grave jeopard.'·· The
special district laws have been extended to the point
where the entire Constitution and free governn1ent are
in jeopardy. The basic issue in the instant case is not
whether we shall or shall not have a sewer in an unincorporated area in Salt Lake County but rather whether
.'
we shall have a constitutional government ruled by that
law or a despotic government ruled by regulations, resolutions and fancies of men.
Our forefathers thought these violations of the basic
rights of local self-government were just for revolution.
1\ ppellant's valid cmnplaint should not have been disrnissed by the district court as "No cause of action." If
our free constitutional governn1ent is to continue, a stand
rnust be made to save it. A flood of Improvement Distr·icts are awaiting the decision of this court. Is it not
better to make our stand before we are engulfed in this
new flood of despotisrn? When constitutional bars are
let down the political pressure increases daily with the
growing pregnancy for larger and larger governmental
corporate endeavors. When the basic political law is circumyented and ignored, respect is soon lost for all laws.
Can a stronger stand be rnade if the nwral fiber of the
people has been further weakened"? Other free nations
failed to rnake the stand until it was too late. Are we
going to repeat the rnistakes of history?
Appellants asks this court to stand rn the dignity
of their duty as guards at the· house which holds the Con-
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stitutional Treasure, and desist from implementing the
legislative efforts of embryonic tyrants in finding attic
and basement by-laws to despoil that Treasure. "God
give us men" with the wisdom and the· courage to stand
against the political pressures of the hlind leaders of the
blind.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE B. FREEMAN,

2024 Lincoln Lane.
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